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ABSTRACT
We turn our aention to the elephant in the room of data
protection, which is none other than the simple and obvious
question: “Who’s tracking sensitive domains?”. Despite a
fast-growing amount of work on more complex facets of the
interplay between privacy and the business models of the
Web, the obvious question of who collects data on domains
where most people would prefer not be seen, has received
rather limited aention. First, we develop a methodology for
automatically annotating websites that belong to a sensitive
category, e.g., as dened by the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR). en, we extract the third party tracking
services included directly, or via recursive inclusions, by
the above mentioned sites. Having analyzed around 30k
sensitive domains, we show that such domains are tracked,
albeit less intensely than the mainstream ones. Looking in
detail at the tracking services operating on them, we nd well
known names, as well as some less known ones, including
some specializing on specic sensitive categories.
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1 INTRODUCTION
e public and scientic interest around data protection,
privacy, and their relationship with new services and busi-
ness models on the Web is reaching an all-time-high. e
intense debates and the pressing needs for evidence-based
policymaking have triggered lots of measurement work in
the area [8, 9, 13, 32, 49, 50, 62, 63, 72, 77, 78].
Research in many cases has jumped directly to asking very
general questions such as “Who is tracking?” [54, 63, 72] and
“How is tracking done?” [1, 60, 69], or proposing holistic
solutions to privacy challenges [70, 84]. Apart from the
technical diculties related to such endeavours, denitional,
ethical, and other debates make these maers even more
complex. E.g., to what extent is it justiable to collect and
sell end-user information in exchange for a free service? is
question is inadvertently present in any study of tracking
on the Web, as well as in any proposal for stopping it or
conducting it in a dierent manner. Opinions on the above
question vary, and this makes it dicult to reach a clear
conclusion when analyzing the ndings of general studies
about tracking.
Yet, there exist some maers related to privacy in which
most people agree. For example, most would not prefer to
be tracked when visiting domains involving sensitive topics
such as religion, health and sexual orientation. is is so
evident that it even appears as an explicit clause in most
data protection regulations, including the EU General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) [28] that considers as sensi-
tive personal data any data “revealing racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade
union membership, also genetic data, biometric data for the
purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data con-
cerning health or data concerning a natural persons sex life or
sexual orientation”. Other governments and administrations
around the world, e.g., in California (California Consumer
Privacy Act (CCPA) [71]), Canada [58], Israel [74], Japan [61],
and Australia [57], are following similar paths [38, 43]. e
public has taken notice and has started to make use of the
new regulations. Indeed, in the rst seven months of GDPR
there have been 95k led complaints relating to it [29]; in
France, this represented an increase of more than 60% [43]
compared to the previous year.
In this paper, we investigate and report on the entities that
track and collect data in web domains where most people
would rather prefer not to be seen by third parties. Being
tracked on a cancer discussion forum, a gay dating site, or
a news site with non-mainstream political anity, is at the
core of some of the most fundamental anxieties that many
people have about their online privacy. Many people visit
such sites in incognito mode. is can provide some privacy
in some cases but it has been shown that tracking can be
performed regardless [3, 33, 82]. In any case, our focus here
is on answering whether such domains are being tracked.
antifying the consequences of such tracking goes beyond
the scope of this paper.
1.1 Challenges
Answering the seemingly straightforward question posed
by this paper is far from simple. As mentioned already, cat-
egories such as health and sexual orientation, have been
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recorded on data protection laws, albeit at a high and ab-
stract level. is makes sense, since such laws are meant to
be interpreted by humans in courts of law. us, following
a complaint, it will fall upon a data protection authority, or
eventually a judge, to decide whether tracking people visit-
ing a particular website violates any clause about sensitive
data, a maer on which we do not have any opinion and
consider outside the scope of our work.
e objective of our work, however, is to answer at scale
whether sensitive domains are tracked, and to do this we
rst need to collect thousands of such domains. is cannot
be done manually by picking one by one individual domains
and, therein, lies our rst major challenge: “how can we clas-
sify arbitrary domains programmatically as sensitive or not
and collect enough of them for a systematic analysis of track-
ing?”. e obvious approach of compiling a list of textual
descriptions directly from legal documents and classifying
based on them, leads to ambiguous results. For example, look-
ing up the term Health at commercial classication systems
such as Alexa [5] and SimilarWeb [68], we obtain domains
about sports, healthy living, and healthy foods, as well as
domains about chronic and sexually transmied diseases.
Manually distinguishing the truly sensitive among the not
so sensitive ones, is not a scalable approach.
Even if one could compile large lists of truly sensitive do-
mains, extracting and identifying the trackers operating on
them remains a formidable task. is is due to problems such
as distinguishing tracking from non-tracking third party do-
mains [31, 65, 72], complex recursive mechanisms used by
trackers to invoke one another along multi-hop tracking
chains, or active eorts by many of them to avoid program-
matic detection and blocking [53].
1.2 Contributions
We develop a scalable and accurate methodology for classify-
ing sensitive domains across dierent categories, including
those mentioned in GDPR. Our approach requires a small
manual eort to pick categories that are truly sensitive from
Curlie.org [23], a large collection of URLs with annotated
categories provided by a global community of volunteer edi-
tors. is can be done easily due to the hierarchical nature
of Curlie.org. Scanning, for example, the Health branch for
truly sensitive sub-branches takes us less than ve minutes.
Having done that, we immediately have access to thousands
of well-labeled domains that can be used as training sets for
deriving dierent Machine Learning (ML) classiers. e
resulting classiers can then be used to detect sensitive do-
mains among arbitrary sets of unlabeled domains, such as
Top-K lists according to popularity. Having such classiers
is, thus, an important building block for tracking services
that track people on sensitive domains on the Web. for the
benet of other researchers and
Moving on, we draw upon recent state-of-the-art work [13,
50, 63] to implement a powerful methodology for detecting
third party trackers operating on large collections of sensitive
domains. Our methodology is able to detect complex, multi-
layer inclusion of trackers [7], as well as the methods used
for exchanging information among them. We apply our
detection methodology upon the sensitive domains that we
used from Curlie.org to train our classiers.
1.3 Findings
Analyzing around 30k domains that belong in sensitive cat-
egories, almost exclusive in the ve sensitive categories as
dened by GDPR, we conclude that:
• Our carefully ltered sets of sensitive domains are
indeed tracked by a multitude of entities. e me-
dian number of third party trackers found on sites of
sensitive categories such as Health, Political Beliefs,
and Sexual Orientation, is 10, 7, and 6, respectively.
is median is smaller than the corresponding one
among TopK domains (17), yet alarmingly high given
the nature of these sites.
• On the top positions in terms of coverage we nd
the same trackers present at non-sensitive domains,
which is again surprising given the very sensitive
character of the domains we analyse.
• We examine in more detail how popular trackers
get into those domains, i.e., whether they are inten-
tionally present by being included directly by rst
party domains, or appear unintentionally through
recursive inclusions initiated by other third parties.
We nd that in the majority of cases the presence is
intentional.
• Going beyond the mainstream trackers, we identify
several niche trackers that are absent from non sen-
sitive domains but have clear presence on sensitive
ones. Investigating them further, we nd several
ones that focus and advertise on their web-sites their
ability to track particularly sensitive categories.
• We study the communication paerns through so-
called cookie synchronization [11, 18, 60] between
mainstream and niche trackers and nd that the two
oen exchange information. We discuss potential
consequences of allowing niche trackers access in-
formation held by mainstream ones.
2 CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY
In this section, we present, in detail, the methodology we de-
velop to annotate websites that belong to sensitive categories.
Data protection laws dene sensitive categories in generic
high level terms such as, Health, Ethnicity, Religion, Sexual
Orientation, Political Beliefs (in the case of GDPR), Adult, etc.
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Figure 1: Flowchart of our Methodology.
Our methodology allows automating an additional rene-
ment step that takes us from generic denitions of sensitive
terms to deciding whether a certain domain in the above
categories is indeed sensitive, in the sense that most people
would rather not be seen visiting it. Our methodology re-
quires a minimal manual ne tuning (something in the order
of 5 minutes) and aer that it is capable to accurately train
machine learning classiers that can be used to detect truly
sensitive domains in arbitrary lists of domains (e.g., in TopK
lists from Alexa [4] and other taxonomy systems). Com-
bining this with our automated methodology for extracting
tracking parties from lists of domains, opens up the road to
puing in place a fully automated process for identifying
sensitive domains and the trackers operating on them. In this
paper we do this for analysis purposes but it is conceivable
that our methods can also be used for proactive monitoring
and enforcement.
Figure 1 depicts a summary of our methodology. At a
very high level, the methodology involves three steps: Step 1
(Manual ltering): An expert user picks from a crowdsourced
taxonomy of domains the branches below a generic sensitive
term such as Health that seem to be truly sensitive. Step 2
(Training): From the selected branches we retrieve thousand
of domains and use them to train a classier. Step 3 (Classi-
cation): We apply the trained classier to arbitrary lists of
domains in which we want to detect other sensitive domains
beyond the ones used in our training set. Next, we elaborate
on the details of the above three steps.
2.1 Utilizing Labeled Websites
To achieve the desired renement, we need a rich enough tax-
onomy and a fast way to pick truly sensitive categories from
it. We decided to use Curlie [23], one of the largest human-
edited directories of the Web. Curlie relies on category editors,
i.e., experienced editors who specialize on a nite set of cat-
egories. is group of editors makes up the majority of the
Curlie community (around 92k active editors). All new edi-
tors apply to edit in small categories at rst, and then apply
to edit additional areas aer they have accumulated a num-
ber of edits. Community’s senior editors are responsible for
evaluating new editors’ applications. is “‘Wikipedia” style
of indexing, helps in assuring a high quality labeling of URLs.
Curlie contains more than 3.5 Millions annotated websites.
ese websites are full path URLs, not just second level do-
mains like in Alexa [5] and SimilarWeb[68]. is is a big
advantage, as the frontpage of a website is not always repre-
sentative of the entire content of a large and complex domain.
For example, the frontpage of a University may not be anno-
tated as a sensitive domain, but a website that is hosted in the
medical school that describes methods to treat cancer could
be annotated as sensitive. Curlie, historically known as the
Open Directory Project (ODP) and DMOZ[25] directory, is
open source and free for use by all. Other directories are ei-
ther not available to the public, e.g., Google AdWords [35], or
are subscription-based and require payment, e.g., Alexa and
SimilarWeb. Although it is believed that these commercial
directories are also human-edited, there is no information
on their annotation methodologies and way of work. Also,
several taxonomies related to commercial campaign planners
avoid including very ne grained sensitive terms. For the
above reasons we have picked Curlie.
Typically, for each category, there is only one category
that matches – the rst-level category. For each rst-level
category, there are a few second-level categories and tens
of third-level categories for each second-level category. For
example, for the category Health, there is one rst-level cate-
gory, also called Health, and 47 second-level categories. e
user of our methodology, has to manually select the rst-level
category, and then for the selected one, the second-level cat-
egories that are considered sensitive. is is the only manual
component in our methodology, and the selection process
takes less than 5 minutes for each (generic) sensitive cat-
egory. Studies have shown that involving humans at this
stage can signicantly improve the quality of the follow-up
automated process [6]. For example, in the case of Health,
questionably sensitive second-level categories such as Edu-
cation, Employment, Animal, Healthcare Industry, are not
selected, whereas second-level categories such as Conditions
and Diseases, Addictions, and Mental Health are selected.
Following this, a list of labeled sensitive websites becomes
readily available by selecting all the websites under the kept
second-level categories (all levels). For example, in the case of
Health, we manually selected six second-level sub-categories
and this gave us 7,144 unique URLs from 3,989 domains of
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truly sensitive Health related pages. e exact list will be
made available upon publication together with all the other
datasets and classiers developed for our work. Even with-
out releasing the data, one can browse the online version of
Curlie to verify that many sub-categories of Health are full
of truly sensitive domains.
2.2 Crawling
We have built a fully automated crawler using Google Pup-
peteer [37], NodeJS [56], and Google Chrome [36], and used
it to visit and render all the websites that have been selected
in the previous step. If a website is not available aer three
aempts or the crawler receives an “HTTP 404 - Page not
Found” error for a specic URL, then the website/URL is
discarded.
For each visited website the crawler collects two types of
information. First, the crawler collect the full HTML code
of the website, and second, all the HTTP(S) requests that
are triggered during rendering time. Towards that end, the
crawler utilizes a website scrolling functionality in order to
trigger additional rst and third party requests that are only
initiated when a specic portion of the website is within
the visible area of the web browser. is can happen due
to lazy-loading [21] optimization algorithms. In the same
path, we also impose an additional delay (1 minute) aer
the window.onload() event is triggered in order to give time
to any tracking scripts and advertisements (if any) to fully
load before we collect data. Note that since we operate at
the browser level we can also observe and record encrypted
(HTTPS) requests.
In the following sections we will explain how we use the
collected data (a) to train a classier to identify websites
belonging to sensitive categories, and (b) to quantify the
presence of third party domains in websites belonging to
such categories.
2.3 Selecting and Training a Classier
Our goal in this paper is not to propose a new classication
algorithm or suggest improvements to existing classication
methods, but rather to combine well known and well under-
stood classication algorithms and o-the-shelf tools [83]
with the right set of data to produce an automated method-
ology for identifying sensitive domains across dierent cate-
gories.
A number of existing classication algorithms are suit-
able for text classication. Some examples are, k-nearest-
neighbor (KNN) [16, 39, 47], Naı¨ve Bayes [24, 26, 46], sup-
port vector machines (SVM) [19, 20, 73, 85], decision tree
(DT) [27, 75, 79], neural network (NN) [40, 52] and dierent
variations [55], maximum entropy [22, 47], etc.
We opt for using a Naı¨ve Bayes classication algorithm.
To be more specic, a multinomial Naı¨ve Bayes algorithm, a
single supervised learning classier that can predict multiple
classes. Our choice relies on the following observations. First,
it has simple and easy training and classication stages [73].
Second, it is a fast learning algorithm that can handle large
numbers of features and classes [19, 51]. ird, the algorithm
has already been tested and proved to work well using the
old version of Curlie (DMOZ) categorization database [59].
Fourth, it has shown comparable, and in some cases, beer
performance compared to other simple and easy to use clas-
sication algorithms [2, 76]. Finally, multiple o-the-shelf
implementations are publicly available for dierent program-
ming languages and frameworks, thereby easily allowing
other researchers to reproduce and validate our results.
2.3.1 Input selection and pre-processing. In Section 2.1
we explained how we collected our labeled dataset. In this
section we provide more details on how we use it as a training
input to our classier.
For each visited website we have two source of informa-
tion, the full HTML code and the list of HTTP(S) requests
as observed during the rendering time of the page. From
the HTML code we exclude all the non-visible elements
(JavaScript, CSS, etc.) except the HTML ¡META¿ tag. From
all the visible elements (human readable content) we extract
all the text. We call this input source, the website content (C).
e ¡META¿ tag contains information related to the website,
such as, the title of the page, a short description and key-
words describing the page content. We call this input source
meta-data (M).
Using the HTTP(S) requests, we also consider a third
source of input, that is, all HTTP(S) requests towards do-
mains other than the one that our crawler is actually visit-
ing (a.k.a, third party domains). We call this input source
third-party domains (TPD). We also consider the third party
domains that are present via recursive inclusion. In this
case, we use the domain of the third party as well as the
level of recursive inclusion as part of the domain name (i.e.,
domainA.com-0, domainB.com-1, etc. ). We call this input
source TPD-LVL. Later, we will examine if classication
based on meta-data or presence of third-party domains can
be as precise as based on content.
In the case of the two input sources, content and meta-
data, we apply some standard preprocessing steps, such as,
(1) language detection in order to exclude any websites with
non English text, (2) transform all leers in lower case format
and (3) remove any stop words (i.e., a, the, etc. ). Finally,
(4) we set a minimum word length to three leers, numbers,
or any combination of the two. In the case of the TPD and
TPD-LVL input no preprocessing is required since we only
have a list of domain names and not a free form text.
2.3.2 Feature engineering and training. With respect to
feature selection, we consider two algorithms as follow:
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Bag-of-Words (BoW): It is a popular Information Retrieval
(IR) technique to represent text as a multiset of its words
by disregarding grammar, but, keeping multiplicity, i.e., the
number of appearances of a word in a document or a corpus
of documents.
TermFrequency-InverseDocument Frequency (TF-IDF):
It is a popular IR numerical statistic that is intended to reect
how important a word is to a document. e TF-IDF value
increases proportionally to the number of times a word ap-
pears within a document and inversely proportionally to its
corresponding frequency among other documents.
During this step each feature selection algorithm searches
through all possible combinations of aributes in the data
(word term in our input) to nd which subset of features
(words) works best for prediction. We use 70% of each dataset
during the training phase and the remaining 30% during the
validation phase.
2.4 Classifying Unlabeled Websites
We can use the trained classier to identify additional web-
sites belonging to the number of classes that our classier
is trained to identify. In order to achieve that, we can use
any list of websites that we want to examine. en, we need
to follow the methodology described above, that is, use a
crawler to fetch the HTML code of the websites and apply
the preprocessing step. Depending on the number of classes
that our classier is able to identify, during the prediction
phase the classier returns a vector of probabilities between
0 and 1 with equal length as the number of classes that it can
identify. e position with the highest probability “P” denes
the prediction category with the corresponding probability
score “P”. If the website being classied does not belong to
any of the sensitive categories that the classier is trained
to nd, the probability vector will include only small values.
3 CLASSIFIER EVALUATION
In this section, we assess the accuracy of classiers trained by
labeled data as described in Section 2.3. We rst describe in
more detail the dierent datasets we used. en, we evaluate
the accuracy of dierent classiers on those labeled data as
well as their sensitivity to dierent parameters. Lastly, we
assess the accuracy and robustness of the classiers when
applied to unlabeled domains from TopK lists.
3.1 Datasets
To bootstrap our study we consider the ve generic sensitive
categories according to GDPR [28], namely, Health, Ethnic-
ity, Religion, Sexual Orientation, and Political Beliefs (the
category Biometric Data is not applicable to our study). We
identify the relevant categories in Curlie and by allocating
Table 1: Statistics about the sensitive subcategories
and labeled websites we used in our study.
Category # Selected 1st- # Labeled Websites # Labeled # Domains # Labeled
(2nd-) level in Selected 2nd- Websites aer Websites aer
Categories level Categories Crawling Filtering
Health 1 (6) 7,164 7,144 3,989 4,909
Ethnicity 1 (21) 3,127 3,126 2,299 1,985
Religion 1 (42) 10,145 10,134 7,018 5,726
Sexual Orien. 1 (10) 3,373 3,373 2,787 1,956
Political Bel. 1 (15) 5,547 5,516 3,874 3,201
Porn - 1,301 1,301 1,293 781
less than ve minutes for each category we select the rst-
level and second-level categories. en, we consider all the
labeled websites for each of the ve categories. For the sta-
tistics of the number of rst-/second-level categories and
labeled websites per category, please see Table 1 (second and
third column).
Following the methodology described in Section 2.3.1, rst
the orchestrated crawler downloads all the websites from
each category, and second, we pre-process the downloaded
data. e result of this process is summarized in Table 1
(fourth column) for each sensitive category. Note that Curlie
provides the full URL, for the number of domains per cat-
egory, see Table 1 (h column). e crawling took place
between March and April 2019. For each website, the cor-
pus contains the human-readable text, the meta-data, and
all the third party domains as we have already explained in
Section 2.3.1.
Ethical considerations: Due to the sensitive content of
the websites, we decided not to use any real user or any
personal identier. e crawlers utilized IPs assigned to
cloud providers and universities. Note also that since we
crawl using scripted web-browsers we see all the content and
HTTP(S) headers and don’t have any issues due to transport
layer encryption.
3.2 Classication Accuracy
Classication accuracy is dened as the percentage score,
from 0% (lowest) to 100% (the highest), that a classier can
accurately assign websites to the associated category. In
this section, we investigate how dierent inputs (features),
combinations and parameters can inuence our classier’s
accuracy.
As a rst step, we have to assess which feature sets (avail-
able input options) are suitable for our classication task.
Towards that end, and to avoid any bias, we consider an
equal number of websites for each category. We also set the
number of features to be three thousand in order to evaluate
the dierent input options (we vary this later). e category
with the minimum number of websites is Sexual Orientation
with 1,956 (for the other categories, see Table 1 (last col-
umn)). us, for each of the other categories, we uniformly
at random select 1,956 websites.
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Table 2: Overview of the accuracy for dierent feature
set sources and feature engineering options. Classi-
er parameters: English text, lowercase, stop words
removal, 3k features, minimum three characters per
word.
Feature Engineering
Feature Source BoW TF-IDF
Content (C) 79.92% 84.29%
Meta-data (M) 77.92% 77.10%
ird Party domains (TPD) 43.28% 44.26%
TPD with Levels (TPD-LVL) 42.27% 43.19%
M + C 81.50% 85.66%
M + C + TPD 81.44% 85.59%
M + C + TPD-LVL 81.45% 85.62%
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(a) Content and Meta-data with
BoW.
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(b) Content and Meta-data with
TF-IDF.
Figure 2: Confusion matrix for the sensitive cate-
gories using as feature source the website text content
and themeta-data as as feature types the BoW and the
TF-IDF.
Following our results depicted in Table 2, when the clas-
sier extracts features only from the text content of the
webpage (C), the classication accuracy is quite high. e
accuracy with BoW is close to 80% and with TF-IDF above
84%. Using only the website meta-data (M) as feature source
yields high classication accuracy, but signicantly lower
than when considering the text of the website both with BoW
and TF-IDF. ird party domains, used directly (TPD) or an-
notated with the inclusion level (TPD-LVL) yield very bad
classication accuracy, for both BoW and TF-IDF – close to
half of the accuracy when considering the text content of the
webpage (C). We also tested all the dierent combinations of
feature sources, and as shown in Table 2, the combination of
website text content and meta-data with TF-IDF yields the
best classication accuracy (85.66%).
3.2.1 Accuracy per category. We then turn our aention
to the classication accuracy per category. Notice that we
use only a subset of the webpages in the classier, thus,
we would like to assess if the classier is able to correctly
Table 3: Top 10 features (out of the 3k) per sensi-
tive categories. Content andmeta-data are the feature
sources and the TF-IDF algorithm is used for feature
engineering (only English language websites).
Ranking Health Ethnicity Religion Sexual Or. Politics Porn
1 Cancer Native Church Gay Party Porn
2 Disease Indian God Lesbian Democrats Sex
3 Health American Bible Sex News Video
4 Treatment Language Christian LGBT Government Teen
5 Syndrome Tribe Faith eer State Free
6 Symptoms History Prayer Bisexual Political Girls
7 Patients People Holy Community Liberal Anal
8 Research Culture Catholic HIV Election Pussy
9 Clinical Tribal Religious Pride Parliament Hot
10 Care Indigenous Love Events Labour Big
classify the websites to the appropriate category. In Figure 2
we present the confusion matrix, i.e., table layout that allows
visualization of the performance of our classication. Each
raw of the confusion matrix represents the percentage of the
instances in the actual class, while each column represents
the percentage of the instances in a predicted class (sensitive
category). A high-level observation is that the classier
predicts with high accuracy the class of the websites that
belong to the same category (the darker the cell the beer).
Nevertheless, there are some shadows that indicate that
in some cases the classier mis-predicts the class. Aer
closely investigating the dierent categories, we observe the
following. For example, in the sexual orientation category,
there are multiple websites (and Curlie subcategories) that
are associated to a specic type of sexuality, e.g., websites
dedicated to only gay men or lesbian women, that do not
share a lot of similar words in the webpage text (i.e. gay
website use men related words and lesbian websites use
women related words). In the case of Health and Sexual
Orientation, we observe that in some URLs related to gay also
discuss sexually transmied diseases. Overall the category
where the classier achieves the highest accuracy is Political
Beliefs (88.3%) and the category with the lowest accuracy is
Sexual Orientation (74.2%).
3.2.2 Feature sets. Another indication that the classica-
tion is robust is the obvious relevancy of the features with
the highest weight selected by the classier. In Table 3 we list
the top 10 features (out of the 3k) in each sensitive category.
e classier is using as an input the websites text content
and meta-data as well as the TF-IDF algorithm for feature
engineering. We observe that the keywords (top features),
that are automatically generated by the classier, are well
suited to characterize each one of the sensitive categories.
3.2.3 Extending the Classifier beyond GDPR sensitive cat-
egories. Another advantage of the classier is that as new
categories are added as an input, it is possible to provide
additional training and improve it. For this, we added as in-
put another sensitive category, namely, Porn. All the quality
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(a) Content and Meta-data with BoW.
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(b) Content and Meta-data with TF-IDF.
Figure 3: Classication accuracy as the number of fea-
tures increase with BoW and TF-IDF.
characteristics of the classier, such as, classication accu-
racy, list of features, and the confusion matrix were slightly
improved. We build the list of Porn websites by manually
selecting them from dierent blocking lists [30] related to
adult content websites.
3.3 Sensitivity on the number of features
Next, we examine the eect of the number of features used
in the training of the classier on the classication accuracy.
Figure 3 shows the classication accuracy for each sensitive
category as well as the overall accuracy, as the number of fea-
tures increases. We present the results for Bag-of-Word and
TF-IDF as feature engineering algorithms, see Figure 3 (a)
and (b), respectively. For each sensitive category and feature
engineering algorithms, the classication accuracy increases
with the number of features. Our analysis shows that, for
each and all categories, there is a “knee” in the classication
accuracy when the number of features is around 1,000. From
Table 4: Execution time for feature engineering and
training time using dierent combination of inputs
and number of features.
Input # Features Feature Eng. Time Training TimeBoW TF-IDF BoW TF-IDF
Content (C)
1,000 13.4s 12.9s 28.1ms 21.7ms
10,000 13.1s 12.9s 48.3ms 39.4ms
100,000 13.2s 13.1s 91.3ms 79.4ms
Meta-data (M)
1,000 920ms 359ms 18.6ms 16.5ms
10,000 893ms 367ms 19.2ms 17.9ms
100,000 878ms 368ms 26.4ms 23.8ms
M + C
1,000 13.2s 13.0s 26.7ms 22.8ms
10,000 13.2s 13.1s 44.4ms 32.8ms
100,000 13.4s 13.4s 86.2ms 67.6ms
3,000 features and onwards, the classication accuracy im-
provement is marginal. One important observation is that
the converged classication accuracy varies across sensitive
categories, but consistently, TF-IDF outperforms BoW across
all categories. For the rest of the results presented in this
paper, unless otherwise noted, we will use 3,000 features
with textual content and meta-data information, and with
TF-IDF for our classication.
With regards to the feature engineering and training time
for the classier, in Table 4, we report the execution time for
the two best feature sources, namely, content and meta-data,
as well as the execution time when both sources are used. All
the experiments were executed on a MacBook Pro 2018 ver-
sion. A rst observation is that the feature engineering time
for content and meta-data does not depend on the number
of features (ranging from 1k to 100k features) nor the feature
engineering method. is is to be expected as the input is
the same, i.e., the corpus of textual content and meta-data.
e feature engineering algorithm, however, does depend
on the input source. Utilizing only meta-data takes less than
a second, where textual content takes about 13 seconds. e
training time does depend on the number of features and
the feature engineering method, as shown in Table 4 (last
two columns), but this time is almost negligible. For either
feature engineering algorithm, the training time increases
only three times, when the set of features increases by three
orders of magnitude. us, training of the classier is very
scalable. When we consider dierent feature engineering
algorithms, TF-IDF not only yields beer classication accu-
racy than BoW, but is also faster. e training of our classier
with 3k features and TD-IDF takes only 23msec.
3.4 Performance of the Classier on
unlabeled data
Next, we evaluate the ability of the classier trained with
labeled sensitive domains from curlie.org to accurately clas-
sify unlabeled sensitive domains in TopK popular lists. As a
showcase, we use the Alexa Top 20k list. We use the latest list
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Figure 4: e true positive rate and the percentage of a
total (134) true positive sensitivewebsites out of a total
1k unlabeled website that we examine as a function of
the classier’s prediction probability threshold.
on the day of crawling (March to April 2019). We decide to
focus only on the top 20k as many of popular webpages are
there and the churn is relative small [67]. Aer the crawling
and applying lters for English language and sucient text
and meta-information we maintained 7,115 websites. We
remind the reader that the main motivation for the training
of such classiers is to use them to automatically identify
sensitive domains by ltering TopK lists and then use the
identied domains to extract the trackers present on them
for analysis or for compliance audits.
Aer running our classier on the above list we identify
several sensitive domains across the dierent categories. We
limit the number of selected websites to 1k out of the 7,115
from Alexa in order to be able to manually examine if indeed
the predicted categories are correct or not. When the pre-
diction probability threshold is set to a small value, such as
0.5 (50%), the classier annotates 186 as sensitive. In more
detail, we get 44 websites belonging to the category Porn, 15
related with Health, 64 with Political Beliefs, 9 with Sexual
Orientation and nally 2 with Ethnicity. We manually in-
vestigated and conrmed that 134 out of the 186 annotated
by the classier were indeed sensitive and belonging to the
corresponding discovered categories.
Our next objective is to optimize the threshold in order
to maximize the number of discovered sensitive websites,
but without mis-classifying many websites as sensitive (false
positives). We remind the reader that our use case is to
collect lots of sensitive websites from arbitrary lists to extract
who is tracking them. us, we are more sensitive to the
precision (positives being real) rather than the recall (nding
all positives) of the classication.
In Figure 4, we show how the percentage of true positive
rate increases as the prediction probability threshold of the
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Figure 5: Adult website rendering example and the in-
clusion chains of third parties at dierent inclusion
levels.
classier increases. However, as the true positive rate in-
creases, less sensitive websites (as annotated by our manual
investigation) are identied as such. Moreover, the percent-
age of a total (134 out of a total 1k) true positive sensitive
websites decreases slower than the true positive rate when
probability threshold of the classier increases. is sug-
gests that we can achieve very high positive rate by missing
a relative small number of true positive sensitive websites.
As shown in Figure 4, the true positive rate exceeds 90% (and
more than 70% of the sensitive sites are identied as such)
when the classier’s prediction probability threshold is 0.63.
4 TRACKERS ON SENSITIVE DOMAINS
In this section, we rst present in detail our methodology
for detecting the presence of trackers on particular domains.
en, we quantify the amount of tracking that takes place
on sensitive domains. Finally, we identify and catalogize the
tracking services operating on them.
4.1 Detection methodology
ird party inclusion chains: For each one of the ren-
dered pages belonging to sensitive domains crawled as de-
scribed in the previous section, we conduct the following.
First, we detect third party domains by following all requests
towards any domain beyond the one originally visited by
our crawler. In order to identify if a third party domain is a
tracker or not, one can use dierent lter lists and method-
ologies as descriped in [41, 72]. Nevertheless, we choose
to include all third party domains in our dataset without
any ltering in order to observe if any unknown third party
tracker operate in sensitive category websites. As will be
shown later, most of the third party domains encountered
are indeed trackers.
Next, using the collected data we construct the third-party
request inclusions for each webpage visit. To do so, we
combine information related to each individual third-party
request, such as, the request type (i.e., the “sub frame” type
identies an iFrame creations), the initiator URL (source) and
request URL (destination) as reported by the “onBeforeSend-
Headers” event listener, the iFrame id and other meta-data
information as necessary. To correctly identify the refer-
rer eld of a request when a third-party script is directly
embedded in the rst-party domain content, we monitor
9,
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Table 5: Statistics about the presence of third party domains per webpage at TopK and sensitive categories.
Category # Websites
# 3rd party HTTP Requests # Unique 3rd parties full domain # Unique 3rd parties TLD+1
Total Per Website Total Per Website Total Per WebsiteMedian Mean STD Median Mean STD Median Mean STD
TopK 7,115 898,929 79 126.34 152.23 27,985 17 24.78 24.92 11,524 12 16.54 15.92
Religion 10,134 497,284 18 49.07 77.31 6,458 6 11.78 16.68 3,619 5 9.03 12.76
Health 7,144 464,660 25 65.04 96.2 5,821 10 16.44 18.92 2,959 8 11.66 12.32
Political Beliefs 5,516 411,279 32 74.56 115.60 4,973 7 14.65 24.15 2,559 5 10.01 15.51
Sexual Orientation 3,373 156,658 19 46.44 97.53 4,355 6 10.28 13.79 2,424 5 7.48 9.12
Ethnicity 3,126 105,203 14 33.65 53.62 3,327 5 8.28 10.80 1,873 4 6.14 7.46
Porn 1,301 92,698 40 71.25 112.61 3,060 7 8.59 8.0 1,865 5 6.07 5.66
All Sensitive 30,594 1,727,782 22 56.47 92.73 18,847 7 12.73 18.0 10,140 5 9.23 12.34
all “sub frame” requests executed at the rst-party domain
level [12]. We then assign the correctly inferred third-party
domain to the newly created iFrame based on the request
URL that is responsible for the iFrame creation.
An example of such inclusions is depicted in Figure 5. At
level 0 (top box) is the actual user-initiated visit to a specic
rst-party domain, in our example “mangporn.net” an adult
content website. At level 1 (middle box) there are 5 dierent
third-party domains that are directly included by the rst-
party domain (publisher) henceforth referred to as Direct
Inclusions. At level 2 (boom box) there are 11 domains
that are included by 3 dierent third-party domains already
included by the publisher at level 1. We refer to such third-
party domain inclusions above level 2 as Indirect Inclusions.
Note that in our example, we use a website with only 2 levels
of inclusion. In our dataset we have observed up to 9 levels.
To be able to understand the interaction between the dier-
ent domains that we observe in each website, we introduce
the notion of Inclusion chains. An inclusion chain is a path
that connects domains based on the order of inclusion. Us-
ing Figure 5, we can identify an inclusion chain between
the rst-party domain “mangoporn.net” towards the third-
party domain “a.discuscdn.com”. e chain includes the
following domains in the exact order: “mangoporn.net”→
“disqus.com”→ “a.disquiscdn.com”. Overall in Figure 5 we
have 13 such inclusion chains. Note here that all these in-
clusions are not visible in the static code of a page. ey
appear only when one fully renders the page. For example,
nytimes.com and nbcnews.com render their content and ads
dynamically while the user scrolls the page. We overcome
this issue as we explain in section 2.2.
Table 5 summarized the number of sites per category, the
total number of HTTP(S) requests in our crawling, and the
number of unique third parties.
4.2 Are sensitive domains tracked?
ey most certainly are! Table 5 shows statistics regarding
the number of third party HTTP(S) requests and domains
(full and second level domain) found on TopK and sensitive
websites. A rst observation is that, although both the mean
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Figure 6: e top 20 third party domains coverage per-
centage (le half) and e percentage (right half) of
the inclusion level in hops that we detect them in the
TopK category.
and median number of third party requests per website in
sensitive websites is signicantly less than in TopK, there
is a signicant number of third party HTTP requests. e
median number ranges from 14 (Ethnicity) up to 40 in (Porn).
When we turn our aention to third party domains, overall,
the median and mean of third party full domains per website
in sensitive websites is lower than this in TopK. Nevertheless,
there are third party domains in sensitive websites, where
visitors of such websites would prefer not to be tracked. Fo-
cusing on the sensitive categories, we notice that the number
of third parties varies across categories. e median number
of third parties in sensitive domains range from as high as
10 for Health related sites, to as low as 5 for Ethnicity related
ones (when the corresponding median for TopK sites is 17).
We also report the numbers for the second level domain,
i.e., TLD+1. We do this as we want to remove bias due to
ephemeral full domains that may be generated by some of
the third parties in the corpus of the webpages we study.
e qualitative observations, however, do not change. e
corresponding median numbers when considering TLD+1
are 8 for Health (highest) and 4 for Ethnicity (lowest), when
for TopK the corresponding number is 12. e qualitative
observation remain the same also when we consider corpo-
rate relationships between domains (e.g., domains belonging
to the same mother company [11]). e above results show
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Figure 7: e top 20 third party domains coverage percentage (le half) and e percentage (right half) of the
inclusion level in hops that we detect them in each sensitive category.
that although clearly less intense than in TopK popular do-
mains (where we expect to observe a high number of third
party HTTP(S) requests and domains [14, 15]), an alarmingly
high number of third parties is present on sensitive domains
across all the considered categories.
4.3 Who is tracking on sensitive domains?
We present the names of the rst twenty third party domains
with the highest cover in the TopK in Figure 6 and in the
dierent sensitive categories that we consider in Figure 7.
A quick inspection reveals that all the encountered third
parties belong to well known tracking services. We also
observe that the top trackers on sensitive domains are the
same ones known to have the highest tracking coverage
among all domains on the web. eir coverage, although
slightly lower than in TopK domains, remains impressively
high in all the sensitive categories we examined. For example
google-analytics.com has at least 40% coverage across all
sensitive categories, including Porn, where it is above 60%
and not far from its corresponding coverage across TopK
domains.
e second part of each subplot indicates the “inclusion”
hop count for each tracker: 0 hops corresponding to direct
inclusion by the rst party domain, 1 hop, inclusion by an-
other third party that is itself directly included by the 1st
party, and so on. We see that the majority of trackers are
directly included by the 1st party, some are included at 1 hop,
few at 2 hops, and a very small percentage at more than 2
hops. A direct 0 hop inclusion eectively means that a track-
ing domain knows without doubt that it is present at the
corresponding (sensitive) domain. With additional recursive
inclusion, a tracking domain may or may not know who the
1st party domain is, depending on how the inclusion was
done.
In summary, despite the special nature of sensitive do-
mains, and the restrictions put by data protection regulation
around them, sensitive domains are intensely tracked by
mainstream tracking service who undoubtedly are aware of
their presence on such sites.
4.4 Are there specialized trackers for
sensitive domains?
Having seen that the top spots in tracking sensitive domains
are occupied by well known trackers, we look further down
the list for less known ones. e reason for doing this goes
beyond mere curiosity. As explained in [48], mainstream
trackers are under intense media, regulatory, and investiga-
tive scrutiny and thus would risk a lot if they behaved care-
lessly, especially with maers relating to sensitive data. On
the other hand, large numbers of smaller trackers y totally
under the radar and might, thus, prove to be more danger-
ous. Next, we rst describe briey how we searched for such
trackers, and then proceed to present our ndings.
4.4.1 Methodology. In order to examine if there exist
“niche” third party trackers with a bias towards sensitive
categories, we apply the following methodology. We esti-
mate the coverage of a third party tracker in a sensitive
category as the number of websites in which we observe
it, divided by the total number of websites in the sensitive
category. en, we exclude third party trackers with high
11
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Table 6: Top 10 third party domains sorted by sensitive category coverage lter based on other category websites
coverage <q.
A/A Health q = 1.0% Ethnicity q = 5.5% Religion q = 2.5% Sexual Orientation q = 3.5% Political Beliefs q = 1.0% Porn q = 2.0%Domain Cat. % Oth. % Domain Cat. % Oth. % Domain Cat. % Oth. % Domain Cat. % Oth. % Domain Cat. % Oth. % Domain Cat. % Oth. %
1 moatads.com 11.17 0.86 ggpht.com 5.40 5.08 contextweb.com 9.33 1.37 maps.googleapis.com 4.29 3.21 sbx.com 6.21 0.14 exosrv.com 14.06 0.22
2 media.net 9.22 0.63 2mdn.net 4.83 3.99 sonobi.com 9.13 .37 yimg.com 4.26 2.01 imrworldwide.com 4.73 0.89 exoclick.com 7.68 0.09
3 ibclick.stream 8.70 0.05 paypal.com 4.79 0.82 districtm.io 9.11 0.69 consensu.org 3.52 3.24 nationbuilder.com 4.58 0.06 nsimg.net 5.07 0.02
4 webmd.com 8.55 0.04 lycos.com 4.54 1.90 storage.googleapis.com 9.03 0.33 gravatar.com 3.37 2.34 d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net 4.00 0.04 yandex.ru 4.76 1.68
5 moatpixel.com 8.31 0.14 lygo.com 4.35 1.81 dtyry4ejybx0.cloudfront.net 9.01 0.00 lycos.com 3.02 2.03 3li.com 3.51 0.65 yadro.ru 4.15 0.97
6 medscape.com 7.89 0.03 tmdn2015x9.com 4.31 1.80 secureaddisplay.com 9.01 0.00 lygo.com 2.81 1.94 outbraining.com 3.15 0.56 tsyndicate.com 3.30 0.07
7 sharethrough.com 6.45 0.45 px12015x1.com 4.31 1.80 deployads.com 8.96 0.11 tmdn2015x9.com 2.81 1.93 sitescout.com 2.99 0.93 highwebmedia.com 2.99 0.01
8 honcode.ch 6.42 0.07 spotscenered.info 4.31 1.44 33across.com 8.91 0.68 px12015x1.com 2.81 1.93 disqus.com 2.59 0.96 statcounter.com 2.84 1.64
9 medtargetsystem.com 5.89 0.03 lexity.com 4.19 .36 tapad.com 4.05 2.24 translate.googleapis.com 2.66 1.65 unrulymedia.com 2.51 0.17 air2s.com 2.84 1.64
10 qualtrics.com 5.26 0.36 maps.googleapis.com 3.64 3.28 w55c.net 3.85 1.78 sharethis.com 2.63 1.74 indexww.com 2.32 0.75 securedataimages.com 2.53 0.01
percentage coverage in the rest of websites not belonging to
the specic sensitive category that we consider.
In order to control the number of excluded third party
trackers we dene a maximum coverage threshold “q”, such
that, if the percentage coverage of a third party tracker on
general websites beyond the particular sensitive category
that we consider is above “q”, we exclude the third party
tracker from the list of suspected niche trackers for the cat-
egory. In Table 6 we report the top 10 niche third party
trackers found in each category sorted based on their cor-
responding coverage within the category. e value of the
“q” threshold used is reported next to each category name in
the rst row of the table.
4.4.2 Findings. Table 6 depicts the names and the cov-
erage of the top-10 niche trackers for each sensitive cate-
gory for dierent values of q. We see that such trackers can
achieve up to 14% coverage within a sensitive category. is
is much lower than the coverage achieved by mainstream
trackers across all domains, which is probably expected given
that such trackers serve niche markets and are, themselves,
much smaller companies.
We manually looked up the discovered trackers and veri-
ed that most of them oer tracking services, whereas some
declared clearly on their web-sites that they indeed special-
ize on the categories that we found them to specialize on. For
example, medtargetsystem.com, owner of domain dmdcon-
nects.com (position 9 in category Health of Table 6) describes
clearly its services for medical professionals and web-sites.
At position 76 of Health (not depicted on the table) we nd
ehealthcaresolutions.com, describing itself as a “a unique
marketing platform that specializes in connecting niche audi-
ences with pharmaceutical and healthcare brands”. At position
89, tapnative.com, oers to “promote your content to millions
of health-conscious consumers and healthcare professionals
exclusively within premium health and wellness websites and
around health-related content.”
Going over to Politics, on position 3 of Table 6 we nd
nationbuilder.com stating on their web-site: “We need more
leaders. And beer ones. Wherever you are on your path to
leadership, NationBuilder Cities will equip you with valuable
tools in real life, starting with scheduled events to help you
build community, share stories, and gain the skills and training
you need to lead in this era.”
At position 96 of Sexual Orientation we nd codeam-
ber.org describing its services as follows: “Who would want
a Background Check? Anyone who wants to know more about
someone new in their life may well want to run a deep back-
ground check on that individual. Whether it’s a new boy or
girl friend, a new neighbor or someone new in your, or your
child’s life who may be or become signicant. Don’t take a
chance. Get a complete background report on them today.”.
Finally, on position 11 of Porn we encounter JuicyAds,
self-described as “the sexy advertising network”.
5 COMMUNICATION BETWEEN
TRACKERS
In this section, we look at the communication paerns be-
tween trackers operating on sensitive domains. We are par-
ticularly interested in investigating whether there are signs
of exchange of information between mainstream third party
trackers that may hold Personally Identiable Information
(PII) for users (email address, rst and last name, etc. ), and
niche third party trackers, that typically don’t have PII, but
may have seen users in a series of sensitive domains.
5.1 Cookies Synchronization
Cookie synchronization [11, 18, 60], or simply CSync, is a
well known technique used by Ad and Tracking entities to
synchronize pseudonymous user IDs that the dierent en-
tities assign to users. Due to the same origin policy [81]
that prevents two third-party domains to directly exchange
information between each other, third-party domains need
to use alternative methods to exchange information. To by-
pass the same origin restriction, two third-party domains
can synchronize their cookies by passing them as arguments
in the URL of an HTTP(S) GET request. e HTTP(S) re-
quest is usually towards a small image 1×1 pixel, hosted
under the second third-party domain. e cookie of the rst
third-party domain is embedded in the request URL as an
argument and the cookie of the second third-party domain
(for the same user) is embedded in the request header. Note
that the default web browser behavior is to include exist-
ing cookies belonging to the visited domain in the request
header. Upon successful cookie synchronization, the two
third-party domains can exchange tracking information in
the background related to the same user. us, they enrich
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Table 7: Statistics on cookie synchronization.
Category #Websites #Domains #Websites %Websites #HTTP #HTTP Req. %HTTP Req. #Unique #CSync %CSync
with Csync with Csync Requests with CSync with CSync Pairs niche pairs niche pairs
Top k 7,115 7,115 1,331 18.71 870,954 13,739 1.58 2,460 145 5.9
Health 7,144 3,989 1,072 26.87 432,332 5,953 1.38 327 42 12.8
Ethnicity 3,126 2,299 90 3.91 93,744 619 0.66 167 7 4.2
Religion 10,134 7,018 588 8.38 464,192 8,675 1.87 296 17 5.7
Sexual Orientation 3,373 2,787 143 5.13 141,729 1,136 0.8 192 16 8.3
Political Beliefs 5,516 3,874 372 9.60 379,887 5,639 1.48 308 36 11.7
Porn 1,301 1,293 5 0.39 92,104 107 0.12 36 0 0.0
All Sensitive 30,594 20,688 2,270 10.97 1,603,988 22,129 1.38 843 67 7.0
Overall 37,709 27,697 3,601 13.0 2,474,942 35,868 1.45 3,006 162 5.4
their data about their existing users and increase their visi-
bility to other rst-party domains in which they do not have
presence but their partners do. For more details related to
CSync see [60].
5.2 Detecting Cookie Synchronization
To detect CSync, as a rst step, we exclude all requests be-
tween third-party domains that do not include any argu-
ments in the URL. en, we lter the URL using a list of
keywords that we empirically build related to CSync ac-
tivities. Some keyword examples are, “usercookie”, “exter-
nal user id”, “usermatch”, “async usersync”, etc. In total, we
have 62 keyword. We also exclude URLs with obfuscated
arguments since we cannot examine if they include any
user related information or cookies. We also assume that
all sub-domains belonging to the same top level domain
plus one (TLD+1), i.e., “pagead2.googlesyndication.com” and
“tpc.googlesyndication.com”, can access cookies belonging
to the TLD+1 “googlesyndication.com”, thus, by default they
can share information for the same user.
More advance CSync detection techniques [11, 60] can
also be incorporated in our methodology, nevertheless, com-
paring our results with those reported in [60] we observe
that the percentage of additional CSync requests is relatively
small. Note that since we collect data with a crawler that has
full control of the web browser we can also analyse HTTPS
requests.
5.3 Statistics on Cookie Synchronization
Next, we turn our aention towards “who talks to whom?”.
In Table 7 we report the number of websites, across cate-
gories including, the TopK and the ve sensitive categories
(rst column), where we identied cookie synchronization in
our study. e second and third column depicts the number
of websites and the number of domains in each category,
respectively. e forth column the number of websites we
detect atleast one CSync instance, and h column the cor-
responding percentage.
When we turn our aention to the percentage of web-
sites with synchronization (h column), we notice that
this varies signicantly across dierent categories. Around
19% of popular websites (TopK) host third parties that ex-
change information using cookie synchronization. In web-
sites belonging to the sensitive categories this percentage is
signicantly lower, typically below 10%, with the exception
of Health, in which 27% of the websites we examined host
third parties that participate in cookie synchronization. On
the other extreme, in Porn, only 0.4% of websites host third
parties that participate in cookie synchronization.
With respect to HTTP(S) requests involved in cookie syn-
chronization (column six, seven and eight). For the popular
TopK websites, the percentage of HTTP(S) requests that are
used for cookies synchronization is 1.58%. Our results agree
with other recent studies that studied cookie synchronization,
e.g., the one in [60], where the authors reported that 1.47%
of the HTTP requests generated from 850 real mobile users
over one year are used for cookie synchronization. Again,
comparing the percentages of the sensitive categories with
the TopK, we observer much lower percentages is sensitive
categories.
Column nine shows the absolute number of CSync pairs
that we detect in each category. We observe that in TopK we
detect 2,460 pairs followed by Health with 327 and Religion
with 296 pairs. e rest of the categories are below 200 pairs.
Next, in columns ten and eleven we show the absolute
number (column ten) of CSync pairs between the niche track-
ing domains reported in Table 6 and the percentage of CSync
pairs in each category belonging to those trackers. We ob-
serve that Health and Political Beliefs have 12.8% and 11.7%
of CSync pairs involved with niche trackers of each category,
respectively.
In summary, cookie synchronization is less common in sen-
sitive websites (except Health), than in popular ones. Porn
is a sensitive category where the cookie synchronization is
rare. Nevertheless, there is exchange of information between
mainstream trackers (that have PII) and niche trackers that
don’t have PII but have seen people on sensitive domains.
Given that the laer y largely under the radar, and may
be prone to more risky exploitation plans for the data they
collect, we nd such exchange of information worrisome.
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5.4 Limitations
We believe that most of the cookie synchronizations between
trackers are visible in our study. We, however, can not ex-
clude other types of communication between trackers, e.g.,
backend server-to-server communication based on private
contracts, that are not visible within the browser (In our
case, our crawler). Moreover, trackers are added in the web-
pages and new contracts for exchange of information be-
tween them are signed at a regular basis. us, in Table 7,
we report lower bounds based on a snapshot of the cookie
synchronization activity, as we observe in our study.
6 RELATEDWORK
A substantial amount of work has touched upon web tracking
across dierent platforms, such as, desktop computers [8, 10,
32, 49, 62, 72, 78], mobile phones and tablets [13, 42, 50, 63]
or mixed platforms (Mobile apps and Web interfaces) [34, 50,
63].
More specically, Lerner et. al., [49] study the evolution
of web tracking over time (1996-2016). Steven et. al., [72]
measure the extend of web tracking in the top 1 Million
websites. e authors in [9, 10] study the privacy impact
of web tracking and web ads. In a similar path, the authors
in [8, 34, 62, 78] study the impact on web tracking when
using AdBlocking tools. With respect to personal data leak-
age, the authors in [42, 69] study the leakage of Personal
Identiable Information (PII). Another aspect of the web
tracking recently studied is the geographic location of track-
ing servers [32, 41, 63].
Few studies include results on tracking of sensitive do-
mains [17, 41, 54, 63, 80]. In these works the study of sensitive
domains is just a small part of a longer study. Some works
looking on tracking and targeting of minors and COPPA
related violations also fall in the area of sensitive domain
tracking [64]. Compared with all these works our results
have greater scale (# sensitive domains examined, # sensitive
categories), greater generality (our methodology can easily
be adapted to monitoring arbitrary sensitive categories), and
ask questions that have not been asked before (“are tracking
domains aware that they operate on sensitive domains?”,
“are there specialized trackers?”, “do specialized trackers talk
to mainstream ones?”).
Text and Web domain classication includes a large body
of scientic literature (see [45] for a recent survey) as well
as several commercial services, both standalone [5, 68], or
as parts of the campaign planers of online advertising ser-
vices [35]. Such services are payment based and opaque as
far as their internals are concerned. Also, most of them avoid
including very sensitive terms since this would constitute an
obvious violation of data protection rules (referring to cam-
paign planners). Web-domain and text based classication
are huge areas upon which we draw tools like TF-IDF [66]
and BoW [44] for feature engineering, Naı¨ve Bayes algo-
rithm [2] for classication, etc. Our contribution in the area
is more on terms of how we combine things together rather
on fundamental tools. Curlie.org [23] is an ideal taxonomy
for nding large lists of sensitive domains really fast, even
manually, due to the hierarchical organization of the informa-
tion. By combining the above with the previously mentioned
tools it is easy to produce accurate classiers for automat-
ically identifying large sensitive domains among arbitrary
lists of domains on the open web.
To the best of our knowledge, the proposed methodology
in this work is the rst generic methodology that allows
a quick and easy way to identify a large number of web-
sites belonging to dierent categories, with a minimal eort
to bootstrap and use. e simplicity and generality of the
proposed methodology makes it suitable for a plethora of
applications in the measurement community to measure and
analyse websites based on dierent categories or similarities.
is generality can be achieved during the training phase
of the classier by selecting training samples related to the
topic of interest or any other common characteristics of the
websites depending on the goals of each study. In this paper,
we showcase just a simple example, how to use it in order
to monitor web tracking on sensitive websites as dened by
GDPR in Europe.
7 CONCLUSION
Given the recent intense debates around data protection,
we’ve been surprised to nd so many tracking services op-
erating on carefully identied sensitive domains. Of course,
one may arrive to such domains accidentally by, say, clicking
on the wrong link, or because one’s device has been hacked.
Most visits, however, are intentional, and, therefore, reveal
sensitive information about the visitor. Our work has shown
that in the majority of cases, it is the owners of such sites that
intentionally include tracking code in order to participate
in advertising revenue sharing programs of large and small
online advertising companies. Such companies, given the
direct inclusion of their tracking code by the site owner, are
clearly aware of their presence on such sites. To avoid being
there, they would have to refuse admission to their revenue
sharing programs to sites that handle sensitive topics. is
would require some manual ltering but, as our work has
demonstrated, most of the eort can be automated. On the
other hand, operators of such sites need to receive revenue
to keep their sites going, and this implies participation in
ad revenue sharing platforms. Perhaps, there should be a
special way to handle tracking and advertising for sensitive
domains. We intent to examine such ideas as part of our
future work.
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